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 
Abstract— A combination of mobile and cloud computing 
delivers many advantages such as mobility, resources, and 
accessibility through seamless data transmission via the 
Internet anywhere at any time. However, data transmission 
through vulnerable channels poses security threats such as 
man-in-the-middle, playback, impersonation, and 
asynchronization attacks. To address these threats, we 
define an explicit security model that can precisely measure 
the practical capabilities of an adversary. A systematic 
methodology consisting of 16 evaluation criteria is used for 
comparative evaluation, thereby leading other approaches 
to be evaluated through a common scale. Finally, we 
propose a dynamic reciprocal authentication protocol to 
secure data transmission in mobile cloud computing. In 
particular, our proposed protocol develops a secure 
reciprocal authentication method, which is free of Diffie–
Hellman limitations, and has immunity against basic or 
sophisticated known attacks. The protocol utilizes multi-
factor authentication of usernames, passwords, and a one-
time password. The one-time password is automatically 
generated and regularly updated for every connection. The 
proposed protocol is implemented and tested using Java to 
demonstrate its efficiency in authenticating 
communications and securing data transmitted in the 
mobile cloud computing environment. Results of the 
evaluation process indicate that compared with the existing 
works, the proposed protocol possesses obvious capabilities 
in security and in communication and computation costs. 
 
Index Terms— Mobile cloud computing, Authentication, Diffie–
Hellman, One-time password. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
obile cloud computing (MCC) is a combination of mobile 
and cloud computing. In general, MCC incorporates 
mobile computing, wireless networking, and cloud computing 
to provide cloud-based services to mobile users. The 
advantages of MCC include mobility, real-time data 
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availability, ease of access, and convenience as users can access 
and manage their data and applications through the Ethernet or  
Internet anywhere and anytime regardless of heterogeneous 
environments and platforms [1]. In addition, MCC enables data 
storage and processing outside the mobile device [2]. 
Successful adoption of MCC necessitates robust and effective 
authentication solutions through which users can utilize cloud-
based services from any mobile device with low computing cost 
on the native resources. Although MCC is beneficial, lack of 
strong security features is a critical factor that may hinder the 
utilization of this technology.  
Accessing and utilizing remote cloud-based resources are 
accompanied with concerns in security and privacy, including 
authentication and authorization of mobile users. In general, the 
mobile devices are connected to the cloud-based resources 
through the insecure wireless channel. As mentioned in [3], the 
main security challenge in MCC is authenticating the identity 
of mobile users  so that forgery attacks can be detected and 
prevented. In forgery attacks, hackers masquerade as real users, 
log in to their accounts, and perform unauthorized actions to 
steal sensitive data. The sensitive data may include users’ 
credentials, identity, location, job, and biometrics stored on the 
mobile device. 
To prevent identity forgery attacks in MCC, connections 
between mobile client (MClient) and cloud server (CServer) need to 
be authenticated. Any connection between MClient and CServer can 
be authenticated using one-way or mutual authentication. 
Although helpful, one-way authentication does not provide an 
absolute secure connection as authentication is performed on 
one side only, that is, MClient authenticates CServer or CServer 
authenticates MClient. By contrast, mutual authentication is 
efficient because ideally, both parties communicating must 
prove their identity to each other. Lack of mutual authentication 
in MCC allows hackers to intercept the communication channel 
and manipulates messages that are transmitted between the 
CServer and MClient. Besides, mobile users are also vulnerable to 
impersonation because their sensitive data can be easily 
obtained through phishing, spyware, and social engineering 
using their mobile devices.   
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Although many authentication schemes have been proposed 
in recent years [4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14], most of 
them lack mutual authentication between MClient and CServers 
[15][16]. Moreover, the existing schemes are vulnerable to 
known attacks such as man-in-the-middle (MITM), playback, 
impersonation, and asynchronization [17][18][19]. These 
attacks represent serious threats to the existing authentication 
protocols in which attackers can do more than observe, modify, 
and/or capture user credentials while transmitting between 
MClient and CServer. The attacker can also reuse the captured 
credentials and retransmit it at a later time for nefarious 
purposes such as circumventing authentication and creating 
duplicate connection [20].  
In this study, to analyze the vulnerabilities of the existing 
schemes, we define a security model that can precisely 
capture the capabilities of the adversary in exploiting the 
vulnerabilities of these studies. The security model covers a set 
of 10 known attacks that create potential threats to the existing 
authentication schemes. We then use a set of 16 evaluation 
criteria to rate the performance of the existing schemes in terms 
of their capabilities to resist the defined list of threats and in 
terms of the computation overhead and communication cost. As 
the main contribution to this research, a dynamic and reciprocal 
authentication protocol is proposed to secure the 
communication between MClients and CServers in MCC 
environment (DRmcc). DRmcc is reciprocal because it 
develops a secure mutual authentication method, free of Diffie–
Hellman limitations, and immune to known attacks. It is 
dynamic because it uses a one-time password (OTP), which is 
automatically generated and regularly updated.  
The DRmcc manages the reciprocity between MClients and 
CServer by applying a special set of rules in two phases: 
registration and connection. In the registration phase, the MClient 
is registered to the cloud service provider using multi-factor 
passwords consisting of international mobile equipment 
identity (IMEI) number, username, and password. Upon 
obtaining the multi-factor passwords, the OTP is generated 
simultaneously at both MClient and CServer by concatenating the 
multi-factor passwords. In the connection phase, DRmcc starts 
working when the mobile requests establish a connection with 
the CServer. Once the connection request is issued by the mobile 
device and received by the server, both the mobile device and 
server start to separately and simultaneously compute the 
Diffie–Hellman parameters to automatically update and encrypt 
(at the mobile client) or decrypt (at the cloud server) the OTP. 
Thus, the connection is established only when the OTP is 
matched.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes 
related works. Section 3 presents the proposed DRmcc 
protocol. Section 4 explains the communication model. Section 
5 provides the threat model and evaluation criteria. In section 6, 
the experimental results are presented. In section 7, the 
performance of the proposed DRmcc protocol is evaluated. 
Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper and provides directions 
for future work. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
This section studies the state-of-the-art of research relevant to 
DRmcc. Numerous reviews have been conducted to analyze the 
advantages and disadvantages of the current studies in MCC 
authentication [17][18][19]. An observational study was 
conducted in [17] to analyze and examine the efficiency of two 
smart card-based password authentication schemes [21][22]. 
This study emphasizes that authentication schemes, which rely 
on smart card, are vulnerable to dictionary attacks. It concludes 
that the computation of session keys is possible where the 
attacker performs a password dictionary attack to obtain the 
user’s password; by eavesdropping on the communication 
channel, the attacker can obtain the user ID and pre-computed 
hash keys stored in the smart card. Using these parameters, the 
attacker can calculate the session key and use it to decrypt 
transmitted messages. Moreover, the password that consists of 
eight characters and is selected from the human memorable 
domain is more vulnerable to dictionary attacks. 
Wang et al. [18] reviewed three mobile device 
authentication schemes [23][24][25] and presented the 
challenges that the researchers face in designing an 
authentication scheme for mobile device, preserving the user’s 
anonymity and privacy. One of the challenges is that the mobile 
device authentication scheme is vulnerable to known session-
specific attacks where temporary information stored in the 
mobile device is leaked due to improper memory clean-up or 
obtained through side-channel attacks. The usage of long-term 
private keys and usernames/passwords within the human 
memorable domain also makes the mobile device 
authentication scheme vulnerable to key-compromise 
impersonation attacks. Another security threat is collusion 
attack, where the attacker colludes with a legitimate foreign 
server to disclose the credentials of the mobile user. A 
systematic framework to evaluate the two-factor authentication 
scheme is conducted in [19]. The conducted framework 
concludes by discontinuing the break–fix–break–fix cycle in 
the research domain of two-factor authentications. 
In addition to the review studies, the state-of-the-art section 
reviews the most recent approaches and schemes proposed to 
enhance the MCC authentication. We classify these proposed 
approaches and schemes into two categories, namely, unilateral 
and reciprocal authentication [26], as illustrated in Fig. 1. The 
following subsections describe these categories in detail.  
 Unilateral Authentication  
This category is a one-way authentication performed at one end 
of the connection (either sender or receiver). Studies in this 
category focus on checking the authenticity at MClient or CServer. 
A biometric authentication mechanism that uses fingerprint 
recognition systems to secure mobile cloud computing [8] falls 
under this category. This mechanism employs existing cameras 
in mobile phones to capture the fingerprint image of a cloud 
user. Then, the captured image is sent to a core-point detection 
phase where feature extraction of the fingerprint image is 
conducted. Finally, the user is verified and authenticated to the 
CServer if the extracted fingerprint image matches the one stored 
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in the database. In addition to its one-way authentication, this 
mechanism has a high cost because it requires a high-quality 
camera to capture an accurate fingerprint image. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Classification of Authentication Schemes in Mobile Cloud Computing 
Another one-way authentication study was conducted by 
[27]. This study proposed a multi-factor authentication method 
for generating an OTP and an additional SMS-based 
authentication system. The OTP generated in this study uses a 
set of factors such as username, password, IMEI, and 
international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), which are 
concatenated and hashed using SHA-256. The SMS-based 
system serves as a back-up mechanism and as a means of 
synchronization. The proposed method reduces the 
organizational cost of purchasing and maintaining hardware 
tokens by using software tokens for verification. However, the 
utilized one-time password is not encrypted and service charges 
are incurred when the SMS-based authentication is used.  
Jeong et al. [9] proposed an authentication system for smart 
devices using multiple factors in a mobile cloud service. The 
system uses ID/password, IMEI, IMSI, voice recognition, and 
face recognition as authentication parameters. The system uses 
the management server to perform load balancing. The load is 
sent to a clustered host of virtual machines to authenticate the 
information given by the mobile user. The result of the 
authentication process is sent to a management server, which 
returns the final authentication result with the user’s 
authentication values to the smart device. This system enhances 
authentication performance because the CServer processes the 
factors in bulk, but no reciprocal authentication occurs between 
mobile users and the CServer. The system also lacks usability and 
privacy because it requires multiple types of sensitive data. 
 Reciprocal Authentication 
This category is a mutual authentication performed by both 
MClient and CServer at the two ends of the connection. Under this 
category, a private authentication scheme conducted in [28] 
uses a smart card generator (SCG). The scheme applies 
dynamic nonce generation and bilinear pairing cryptosystem 
techniques. This scheme reduces the complexity of discrete 
logarithm problems. Mobile users or service providers register 
to the SCG by providing their information while the SCG 
computes and securely sends the respective private keys to 
MClient and CServer. When MClient and CServer want to 
communicate, a card provided by the trusted SCG is used to 
authenticate both of them. Although this scheme is conducted 
to support mutual authentication, an attacker can still 
impersonate CServer to MClient. Also, the attacker can extract 
MClient’s real identity while executing the CServer impersonation 
attack [29]. Another limitation of this scheme is the risk of 
losing the card, which is essential for both MClient and CServer to 
authenticate each other. 
The security limitations in [28] are addressed by a recent 
scheme [29], which constructs privacy-aware authentication for 
MCC services by using an identity-based signature scheme. As 
this scheme is constructed based on the SCG scheme [28], it 
still inherits security limitations such as the inability to resist 
impersonation attacks and stolen smart card attacks.  
A combined approach of fine-grained data access control 
over distributed cloud servers using mobile user authentication 
mechanisms is proposed in [11]. In particular, this scheme is 
proposed to control mobile users’ privileges relevant to 
accessing the data stored in the cloud-based multi-server. This 
approach ensures that both parties of cloud server and mobile 
users are verified before generating a permission key and shared 
session key required to access the data stored in the cloud 
server. However, this scheme is vulnerable to asynchronous 
attacks where an attacker can delay the transmitted message 
intentionally beyond the acceptable time, causing both parties 
to fail the authentication and authorization process [13].  
An approach to using the OTP as a service has been 
proposed in [30]. This method describes an architecture 
between service provider, cloud user, and one-time password 
provider. The proposed architecture is not intended to solve a 
traditional username or password, but adding a second factor to 
traditional authentication offers a stronger and more efficient 
authentication process. In this approach, the user is expected to 
run the private key exchange phase for every service used in the 
cloud [15]. This approach is still lacking in usability because 
users are expected to remember the characters of the OTP and 
type them within a given period for authentication purposes. 
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A three-factor-based authentication scheme for real-time 
data access in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is proposed in 
[12] to provide higher security and operational efficiency when 
compared with the two-factor-based authentication schemes. 
The proposed scheme uses smart card, biometric information 
and user’s password and username factors to provide an 
authenticated real-time access to data in WSNs. This scheme is 
resistant to password/biometric key guessing attacks, replay 
attacks, clone card attacks, node capture attacks, and protects 
user/sensory anonymity besides providing mutual 
authentication. However, this scheme is vulnerable to 
asynchronous attacks as it uses time stamps to validate the 
transmitted messages between all parties. This scheme may 
allow attackers to delay the message transmission, thereby 
causing failure to authenticate between the user, gateway, and 
sensor nodes [13]. Moreover, the three-factor scheme involves 
a high number of operations that may cause an extra 
computation overhead. The extra overhead along with sensor 
nodes that has limited memory may lead to a reduction in the 
efficiency of the proposed scheme [15]. 
A smart-card-based password authentication scheme is 
proposed in [31] as an alternative solution for the two-factor 
authentication scheme. Although helpful, this scheme depends 
on smart cards and therefore, it may inherit the limitations of 
the smart card-based schemes as described in [17]. 
Reference [13] introduced a lightweight anonymous 
authentication scheme with forward secrecy (LAASF) that is 
resistant to security threats such as asynchronization attack and 
smart card loss attack (SCLA). LAASF is formed to be resistant 
to security attacks such as smart card loss and replay attack. 
However, the authentication scheme involved a system of three 
parties where an external user has a smart card, a sensor node, 
and a gateway node. Thus, LAASF requires authentication 
among these three parties. Moreover, LAASF uses the same 
secret key of gateway node (GWN) and long-term secret key 
between the user and GWN in its authentication processes.  
An RSA-based authentication scheme [14] has been 
proposed for use in healthcare service, where it can resist 
password guessing and ensure key agreement during the 
exchange of two messages. Two-factor authentication is used 
in this scheme, which requires a user’s ID, a password, and a 
smart card. The scheme uses timestamp and hash keys XOR 
with a random value to send messages to the server for 
verification and vice versa. The scheme is said to resist various 
attacks such as insider attack, password guessing, stolen smart-
card attack, and impersonation attack. It can also preserve user 
anonymity, unlinkability, and secure the session key. However, 
the scheme uses timestamps to verify valid messages in the 
authentication process; therefore, it inherits the limitation 
described in [11], where the scheme is vulnerable to an 
asynchronous attack that causes delayed messages and failure 
of authentication between client and server.  
Most of the work related to the DRmcc protocol is the 
message digest-based authentication (MDA) scheme [10][32]. 
The MDA scheme consists of two phases: one where the CServer 
authenticates the MClient and another in which the MClient 
authenticates the CServer. Although this scheme provides mutual 
authentication, the authentication operations involve many 
processes such as the generation of random and authentication 
keys, hashing of message digests, and encryption and 
decryption of the message digest, which is performed in both 
parties. Moreover, a large number of messages are transmitted 
between the MClient and CServer, which makes the MDA scheme 
less efficient [15]. Aside from that, as the MDA scheme utilizes 
the standard Diffie–Hellman algorithm, it is vulnerable to 
MITM attacks, which may be launched to sniff 
encryption/decryption keys during the process of private–
public key distribution. 
The single/multi-factor authentication schemes reviewed in 
this paper have merits and limitations, which depend on the 
capability or incapability to resist the various attacks that the 
adversaries may use to gain an unauthenticated connection. 
These schemes are resistant to most but not to all of the attacks.  
The schemes proposed in [9][11][12][14] are not resistant to 
asynchronous attacks. Schemes in [10][31][32] are vulnerable 
to playback attacks [20][29]. Given that these methods encrypt 
credentials of MClient before transmitting them to the CServer, 
these methods may be safe against capturing and modifying 
credentials but are not immune to replay attacks. In replay 
attacks, attackers are able to capture the credentials and reuse 
them to establish a new connection even if the credentials are 
encrypted once transmitted. Moreover, schemes that are 
proposed in [9][10][11][32] are vulnerable to shoulder surfing 
attacks. In addition to the limitations discussed with every 
method, it should be stated here that all schemes 
[9][10][11][12][13][14][32] have scalability shortcoming, as 
they require high communication cost as well as high 
computation overhead. 
The DRmcc protocol mitigates the limitations of unilateral 
authentication methods by conducting mutual authentication at 
MClient and CServer. This protocol also alleviates the limitations 
of the reciprocal authentication methods by proposing a 
lightweight method to reduce the number of processes and 
provide scalable communication between MClient and CServer. 
Although the DRmcc protocol partially utilizes the Diffie–
Hellman structure, it has a significant contribution to prevent 
the MITM attack, which may be inherited from Diffie–
Hellman. Moreover, the DRmcc protocol is secure against 
impersonation, replay, and asynchronization attacks by using a 
different OTP for every connection. Furthermore, the DRmcc 
is resistant to shoulder surfing attacks as the OTP is 
dynamically and automatically generated by the MClient and 
CServer without the need to be keyed in by the users. 
III. DRMCC AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL  
This section describes the proposed protocol DRmcc and its 
mutual multi-factor authentication scheme. The DRmcc 
consists of registration and connection phases, as illustrated in 
Fig. 2. These two phases are described in the following 
subsections. 
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Fig. 2. DRmcc authentication protocol. 
A. Registration Phase 
Two ends are involved in the authentication process, namely, 
mobile (MClient) end and cloud provider (CServer) end. In the 
registration phase, the MClient requests to register as client to the 
CServer. Thus, it is required to set up an account on the CServer by 
registering its username, password, and IMEI metrics. In this 
protocol, the metrics of registration can be exchanged between 
the MClient and CServer using out-of-band authentication method 
such as SMS to strengthen immunity against MITM attacks. 
Therefore, the probability of sniffing these metrics and using 
them to spoof the identity of one of the connection ends is not 
considerable. In addition to the authenticity of the utilized out-
of-band method, the protocol does not present a considerable 
extra communication overhead because it is made for one time 
only at the beginning of the registration phase. Moreover, to 
arrange for a reciprocal authentication during the connection 
phase, a one-time password (OTP) is generated as a 
concatenation of the username, password, and IMEI metrics. 
These metrics along with the OTP are saved in a small database 
in MClient and CServer. 
B. Connection Phase 
Connection phase starts when MClient requests to connect and 
gain access to CServer. To get connected, both CServer and MClient 
simultaneously implement a set of rules in order to authenticate 
the communication between each other as shown in Fig 2. The 
implemented set of rules represents the DRmcc authentication 
protocol proposed in this paper. The DRmcc protocol is 
executed separately at the CServer and MClient. The authentication 
process depends on using an OTP-generated instantly for every 
connection. In the DRmcc protocol, each CServer and MClient uses 
the former OTP saved from the previous connection to generate 
an instant OTP to be used in a new connection. For the first time 
of connection, both CServer and MClient use the OTP saved during 
the registration phase. In general, maintaining the reciprocal 
authenticity of the two ends of connections in the connection 
phase is achieved through two main steps: generating an instant 
OTP and encrypting or decrypting the instant OTP. 
The instant OTP is automatically generated by using the 
former OTP and Diffie–Hellman-shared parameters, 
particularly a prime number (P), a generator number (G), and 
the secret session key (K). In DRmcc, the values of P and G are 
generated from the former OTP content. The generation process 
is made by extracting the numerical digits from the content of 
the former OTP. The P value is generated by computing the sum 
of all the numerical digits included among the contents of the 
former OTP. The G value is generated by counting the total 
number of numerical digits included in the content in the former 
OTP. According to Diffie–Hellman, the values of P and G 
should be prime numbers. Thus, if the computed value of P is 
not a prime number, the closest prime number greater than the 
current value of P is calculated and used as a prime value for P. 
Likewise, if the value of G is not a prime, the closest prime 
number smaller than the current value of G is calculated and 
used as a prime value for G. 
In encrypting or decrypting the instant OTP, the Diffie–
Hellman algorithm is used to encrypt (at MClient end) or decrypt 
(at CServer end) the instant OTP generated in the previous step. 
The parameters required to generate a shared secret session key 
(SSK) at MClient and CServer using Diffie–Hellman are P, G, 
public key of mobile client PKmc, and public key of CServer PKcs. 
In this regard, the values of P and G need not be exchanged 
between MClient and CServer because these values have been 
automatically and separately computed in advance at the mobile 
and cloud sides. The public keys PKmc and PKcs are generated 
based on the Diffie–Hellman algorithm. The mobile then sends 
its public key PKmc to CServer, and CServer sends its public key 
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PKcs to MClient. Exchange PKmc and PKcs between MClient and 
CServer is the unique exchange process in the DRmcc protocol. 
The key advantage of DRmcc is that if it happens that PKmc and 
PKcs are sniffed using MITM attack, it does not affect the 
authenticity of DRmcc as the SSK cannot be computed without 
knowing the other parameters of Diffie–Hellman such as P, G, 
private random key of mobile client PRKmc, and private random 
key of CServer PRKcs. Moreover, in the DRmcc protocol, values 
of the Diffie–Hellman parameters are not constant; they are 
updated and changed for every connection, which makes the 
SSK immune to hacking attempts. 
Once the public keys PKmc and PKcs are computed using 
Diffie–Hellman method, the MClient and CServer exchange the 
public keys with each other to compute the Diffie–Hellman 
shared SSK. Upon receiving the PKmc and PKcs from the client 
and server, calculation to obtain the shared SSK is performed 
in the client and server simultaneously. Once the SSK number 
is generated, its value is concatenated with values of P and G 
parameters to generate the new OTP. 
Given that the instant OTP is generated by concatenating 
the values of the former OTP, P, G, and SSK, two consequences 
should be considered to maintain the usability of the DRmcc 
protocol. The first consequence is relevant to the OTP 
characters where after a few connections, the entire OTP 
content becomes digits only. Thus, the value of G is fixed for 
the new connections. DRmcc protocols mitigate this 
consequence by converting the values of P, G, and SSK into 
hexadecimal values before concatenating them to the former 
OTP. In this way, the instant OTP is guaranteed to include the 
mixed content of digits and characters and thus, the value of G 
remains variable continuously. The second consequence is the 
length of the OTP, where after a number of connections, the 
length of the instant OTP may become excessive. Thus, the 
length of the instant OTP is checked with every connection to 
verify if it exceeds a predefined maximum length of OTP 
(OTPmax). The OTPmax is set as 16, 32, or 64 characters based 
on the demands of the administrator. If the length of the instant 
OTP exceeds the predefined maximum length, then the length 
of the instant OTP is reduced by deducting the outcomes of the 
predefined maximum length (OTPmax) from the current length 
of the instant OTP. 
The shared SSK is then used as a symmetric key for 
encrypting (at the MClient side) and decrypting (at the CServer side) 
the instant OTP. The final authentication process starts when 
the MClient encrypts the instant OTP using the computed SSK 
and sends it to the CServer. In turn, the CServer verifies the 
authenticity of the MClient in two processes. The first process is 
by decrypting the received OTP using the shared SSK 
computed at the CServer. The second process is by comparing the 
decrypted OTP with the instant OTP, which is generated at the 
server. If the OTPs generated at the MClient matches the one 
generated at the CServer, then the server and mobile establish the 
communication session and start the data transmission. Once 
the connection is successfully established, both MClient and 
CServer update the old OTP stored in their database with the 
recent OTP used in the active connection. The stored OTP is 
not updated in case the connection between MClient and CServer is 
not successfully established for any reason. 
II. COMMUNICATION MODEL 
The communication model of DRmcc is described by 
Algorithm 1. In the algorithm, first a MClient is registered to the 
CServer by passing the mobile identity number 𝑴𝒊𝒅, a user 
identity number 𝒖𝒊𝒅, and an initial password x0. For each 
connection request i, exchange keys A (on the client side), B 
(on the server side), and the encrypted message 𝑴𝑬,𝒊 is 
formulated. The terms A and B are calculated on the client side 
and the server side by 
𝑨 = (⌈𝒎⌉𝒑)𝒂𝒊𝐦𝐨𝐝 ⌊∑ 𝑺𝒌
𝒎
𝒌=𝟏
⌋
𝒑
 
𝑩 = (⌈𝒎⌉𝒑)𝒃𝒊𝐦𝐨𝐝 ⌊∑ 𝑺𝒌
𝒎
𝒌=𝟏
⌋
𝒑
 
(1) 
where S is the set of all numeric characters in Fj i.e., 𝐒 =
{⋃𝒌∈𝑲𝑭𝒋𝒌 |  𝑭𝒋𝒌 ∈    ℕ  𝐰𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐞 𝑲 =  {𝟏, 𝟐, … , 𝒏}} and n is the 
length of Fj,  m is the length of Sk, ai is the secret key generated 
by the client at connection request i, ⌊𝒛⌋𝒑 is the largest prime 
number less than z, and ⌈𝒛⌉𝒑is the smallest prime number larger 
than z. Then, considering encryption and decryption processes, 
the value of the key 𝑲𝒊 can be deduced using 
 
𝑲𝒊 = [(⌈𝒎⌉
𝒑𝐦𝐨𝐝 ⌊∑ 𝑺𝒌
𝒎
𝒌=𝟏
⌋
𝒑
)
𝒂𝒊𝒃𝒊
] 𝐦𝐨𝐝 ⌊∑ 𝑺𝒌
𝒎
𝒌=𝟏
⌋
𝒑
 
(2
) 
 
(2) 
Thus, we check the encryption and decryption of a certain 𝑭𝒋 
result in the same key value. Finally, the encrypted message as 
a one-time password is formulated as follows: 
      𝑴𝑬,𝒊 = 𝑬(𝒇(𝑴𝒊𝒅, 𝒖𝒊𝒅, 𝒙𝒋), 𝑲𝒊), 
= 𝑬(𝒇(𝑴𝒊𝒅, 𝒖𝒊𝒅, 𝒉(𝒙𝒋−𝟏, 𝑲𝒊−𝟏)), 𝑲𝒊), 
(3) 
where E(.) is an encryption function, and h(.) is a password-
update function. The encrypted message depends on all the 
previous passwords and generated keys, which add the level of 
complexity to detect the password. The decryption process can 
be presented by FD = D(ME,i, Ki), where D(.) is the decryption 
function. 
IV. THREAT MODEL AND EVALUATION CRITERIA 
This section describes a realistic adversary model [33][34][35], 
which explicitly defines the capabilities of the attacker that 
threatens the proposed DRmcc protocol. A set of 10 criteria 
used is also presented to evaluate the performance of the 
DRmcc protocol compared with the existing works. Both the 
adversary model and evaluation criteria are further described in 
the following subsections. 
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ALGORITHM 1. DRmcc communication model. 
 
A. Adversary Model 
Defining an adversary model is necessary to assess the security 
of the proposed DRmcc protocol. To this end, the following 
describes the main capabilities of adversary Ā in DRmcc: 
1) Adversary Ā is able to sniff the values of the parameters P 
and G shared between the MClient and CServer as well as in 
full control of the exchanged values of  PKmc, and PKcs.   
2) Adversary Ā can capture the data exchanged between 
MClient and CServer and reuses the captured credentials at a 
later time to duplicate the connection and obtain access to 
the system. 
3) Adversary Ā may obtain and analyze the OTP to know the 
identity of the sender and receiver or to link messages.  
4) Adversary Ā is able to practice offline guessing for all the 
parameters of P, G, PKmc, and PKcs at MClient or CServer. 
Thus, the adversary is able to guess the OTP offline.  
5) Adversary Ā is able to retrieve the previously generated 
session key(s).  
6) Adversary Ā may obtain and analyze the previously 
utilized OTP to generate a new OTP to be used in 
establishing an illegal connection with MClient.  
7) Adversary Ā is able to obtain and analyze the previously 
utilized OTP to generate a new OTP to be used in 
establishing an illegal connection with CServer.  
8) Adversary Ā is capable of releasing the OTP by exploiting 
the delay between the time of creating that OTP and the 
time of using it. This way, adversary Ā can use the created 
OTP before it is used by MClient or CServer.  
9) Adversary Ā  may watch over the victim’s shoulder to nab 
the OTP during the time it is being keyed into an electronic 
device. Thus, the adversary is able to steal the identity of 
the victim, which can be either MClient or CServer. 
10) Adversary Ā is able to recover the OTP from the SIM card 
of MClient by practicing offline, online, or hybrid guessing. 
B. Evaluation Criteria 
We create our evaluation criteria set by considering the 
consistency with the evaluation criteria applied in the previous 
studies [19][31][36]. Our evaluation list covers 16 criteria that are 
essential to evaluate the performance of DRmcc in terms of 
security, usability, deployability, computation overhead, and 
communication cost that the DRmcc protocol satisfies: 
1) Resistance to MITM attacks: The parameters required to 
generate a shared SSK at MClient and CServer in DRmcc are 
P, G, PKmc, and PKcs. In this regard, the values of P and G 
need not be exchanged between the MClient and CServer as 
these values have been automatically and separately 
computed in advance at the mobile and cloud sides. The 
public keys PKmc and PKcs are generated based on the 
Diffie–Hellman algorithm and exchanged between MClient 
and CServer. However, even if PKmc and PKcs are sniffed 
using MITM attack, it does not affect the authenticity of 
DRmcc because the SSK cannot be computed without 
knowing the other parameters of Diffie–Hellman such as 
P, G, PRKmc, and PRKcs. This way, the DRmcc protocol is 
not vulnerable to MITM attacks and can resist insider 
attacks. 
2) Resistance to playback attack: The attacker reuses the 
captured credentials and retransmits them at a later time to 
duplicate the connection and gain access to the system. The 
DRmcc protocol utilizes a different OTP generated 
instantly for every connection. Each CServer and MClient uses 
the former OTP saved from the previous connection to 
generate a new and instant OTP for a new connection. 
Therefore, DRmcc is secure against playback attack where 
every generated password cannot be used for more than 
one connection. 
3) Resistance to server impersonation attack: To impersonate 
CServer, an adversary needs to decrypt the OTP, which the 
MClient uses to request the new connection. To decrypt the 
OTP sent by the MClient, the adversary requires obtaining 
the values of P, G, and SSK. The values of P, G, and SSK 
have been automatically and separately computed at the 
mobile and cloud sides without exchanging them between 
the MClient and CServer.  In this manner, the adversary is 
unable to sniff the values of P, G, and SSK, and is therefore 
unable to practice the CServer impersonation attack. 
4) Resistance to client impersonation attack: To impersonate 
MClient, an adversary needs to encrypt the OTP, which the 
CServer uses to accept the new connection. To encrypt the 
OTP to be sent to CServer, the adversary requires obtaining 
the values of P, G, and SSK. The values of P, G, and SSK 
have been automatically and separately computed at the 
mobile and cloud sides without exchanging them between 
MClient and CServer.  In this way, the adversary is unable to 
sniff the values of P, G, and SSK, and therefore unable to 
practice the MClient impersonation attack. 
5) Anonymity and unlinkability: The authentication process 
in the DRmcc protocol completely depends on the OTP. 
The utilized OTP is generated separately and 
simultaneously at the MClient and CServer using various 
dynamic parameters, where these parameters do not 
include any detail about the identities of the sender or the 
receiver.  Therefore, the adversary cannot obtain the 
identity of the sender or the receiver from the OTP. The 
adversary cannot link messages as the OTP is a variable 
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string, which dynamically changes its content every time 
during communication. Thus, anonymity and unlinkability 
are preserved. 
6) Resistance to offline password guessing attack: To 
correctly guess the OTP at MClient, the adversary needs the 
PKcs, which is not stored at MClient. Likewise, to correctly 
guess the OTP at the CServer, the adversary needs the PKmc, 
which is not stored at the CServer. Thus, the OTP of DRmcc 
resists the offline password guessing attack. 
7) Immunity to session key retrieval attack: In the DRmcc 
protocol, the connection password and session key are the 
same, which is the OTP. The OTP is not exchanged 
between the MClient and CServer in plain text; rather it is 
encrypted at the sender side and decrypted at the receiver 
side using a one-time key, which consists of a 
concatenation of P, G, and SSK values. Thus, DRmcc 
resists the session key retrieving attack, as the adversary 
does not have the encryption key to decrypt the OTP.   
8) Resistance to asynchronization attack: With every 
connection,  CServer and MClient simultaneously generates a 
new OTP. The new generated OTP is valid for a single 
connection only and is immediately used for that 
connection. Thus, DRmcc is resistant to asynchronization 
attack. 
9) Immunity to shoulder surfing attack: In the RDmcc 
protocol, the OTP is not required to be keyed in for every 
new connection; rather, the CServer and MClient dynamically 
and automatically generates it. Thus, DRmcc is immune to 
the shoulder surfing attack. 
10) Resistance to stolen smart card attack: DRmcc does not 
depend on the smart card; thus, it is not subjected to stolen 
smart card attacks. However, DRmcc as a dynamic 
protocol depends on the mobile device to generate the OTP 
for every connection. Retrieving the current OTP from the 
mobile device is protected with a biometric password of the 
mobile user such as fingerprint, eye print, or face 
recognition. Such passwords are difficult to crack and 
therefore, the DRmcc is also resistant to stolen device 
attack. 
11) Mutual authentication: Both CServer and MClient are able to 
authenticate each other. 
12) One-time password: For every single connection, a new 
password is created, which is valid only for a single 
connection. 
13) Dynamic password generation: The utilized OTP is 
automatically generated and regularly updated by each 
MClient and CServer without human involvement. 
14) Usability: DRmcc offers the benefit of being memory-wise 
effortless, easy to learn, and efficient to use.  
15) Deployability: The DRmcc protocol does not require 
typing the password, and offers negligible-cost-per-user 
because it is lightweight in computation and 
communication. DRmcc also offers the benefit of not using 
a third-party for authenticating MClient or CServer. 
16) Scalability: This is evaluated by measuring the complexity 
of operating the DRmcc protocol at each MClient device and 
CServer, particularly under limited memory resources and 
processor speed. In this study, the complexity is measured 
by calculating the computation overhead involved and 
extra communication cost. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
This section presents experimental results that demonstrate the 
new features of DRmcc. Java simulation is developed to serve 
as a testbed for evaluating whether the proposed DRmcc 
protocol provides a mutual authentication communication. 
Experiments were conducted using a mobile user’s cloud 
account and a mobile device that are registered to the CServer 
using a unique IMSI. Table 1 shows information, which the 
MClient uses to register with CServer and the initial OTP generated 
at both MClient and CServer. The mobile user is prompted to enter 
the username and password. IMSI number is automatically 
extracted from the utilized mobile device and submitted along 
with the username and password to CServer. The username, 
password, and IMSI are used at both MClient and CServer to 
generate the initial OTP. 
TABLE 1 
REGISTRATION INFORMATION 
Registration 
Information 
Mobile Client Cloud Server 
User ID A9hme4da A9hme4da 
User Password $xas7zbkm $xas7zbkm 
IMSI 545781549854164 545781549854164 
Initial OTP 
A9hme4da$xas7zbkm5
45781549854164 
A9hme4da$xas7zbkm5
45781549854164 
 
The initial OTP is then used to generate the new OTP. For any 
new connection, a new OTP is dynamically generated as a 
concatenation of the previous OTP, P, G, and SSK values. The 
values of P and G of the Diffie–Hellman algorithm in both the 
MClient and CServer are extracted from the previous OTP. The 
values of PRKs are randomly generated for each MClient and 
CServer. Upon receiving the PRKs, each MClient and CServer 
computes its PK. The computed PKs are exchanged between 
the MClient and CServer to compute the SSK, which must be the 
same values at the MClient and CServer. For instance, values for 
Connection 1, as shown in Table 2, are 97 and 17 for P and G, 
respectively. PRK values for MClient and CServer are 845 and 512. 
PKs are 56 and 61 for MClient and CServer, respectively. The 
computed values of SSK are 35 at MClient and CServer. 
Once verified by the server, MClient gains access to the cloud 
service provider CServer and the current OTP is replaced with the 
new one. However, the dynamic OTP password is not displayed 
to the mobile user, and it can be retrieved using biometric 
password of the mobile user. Table 2 shows the dynamic OTP, 
which is dynamically generated by MClient and CServer for every 
connection. 
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TABLE 2 
DYNAMIC OTP GENERATED FOR EVERY CONNECTION 
A: Dynamic OTP at MClient 
Connection P G PRK PK SSK 
OTP to be encrypted (32 
Characters) 
1 97 17 845 56 35 
9hme4da$xas7zbkm5457
81549854164ed3d7 
2 107 19 767 57 53 
a$xas7zbkm54578154985
4164ed3d7105b51 
3 107 23 312 53 89 
zbkm545781549854164e
d3d7105b51105b51 
4 113 27 542 104 57 
5781549854164ed3d7105
b51105b511148d5 
5 127 29 293 97 16 
9854164ed3d7105b51105
b511148d5136c54 
6 109 29 764 73 78 
4ed3d7105b51105b51114
8d5136c5410ad72 
7 89 23 409 7 44 
7105b51105b511148d513
6c5410ad72d9db8 
8 97 27 198 64 64 
51105b511148d5136c541
0ad72d9db8ed7dc 
9 97 23 946 32 49 
b511148d5136c5410ad72
d9db8ed7dced63d 
10 89 19 547 24 29 
48d5136c5410ad72d9db8
ed7dced63dd9c19 
B: Dynamic OTP at CServer 
Connection P G PRK PK SSK Decrypted OTP 
1 97 17 512 61 35 
9hme4da$xas7zbkm5457
81549854164ed3d7 
2 107 19 294 36 53 
a$xas7zbkm54578154985
4164ed3d7105b51 
3 107 23 654 99 89 
zbkm545781549854164e
d3d7105b51105b51 
4 113 27 946 72 57 
5781549854164ed3d7105
b51105b511148d5 
5 127 29 594 8 16 
9854164ed3d7105b51105
b511148d5136c54 
6 109 29 277 104 78 
4ed3d7105b51105b51114
8d5136c5410ad72 
7 89 23 612 57 44 
7105b51105b511148d513
6c5410ad72d9db8 
8 97 27 497 27 64 
51105b511148d5136c541
0ad72d9db8ed7dc 
9 97 23 115 82 49 
b511148d5136c5410ad72
d9db8ed7dced63d 
10 89 19 707 6 29 
48d5136c5410ad72d9db8
ed7dced63dd9c19 
 
VI. RESULT EVALUATION 
In this section, we evaluate the proposed DRmcc protocol by 
comparing its performance with other existing works 
[9][10][32] in terms of security, usability, deployability, 
computation overhead, and communication cost. To compare 
and rate relevant schemes across a common spectrum, we use 
the criteria suggested in [36], which analyzes the use of 
passwords in different authentication methods. Table 3 shows 
the short forms and symbols used for comparison purposes. 
TABLE 3 
SHORT FORMS AND SYMBOLS USED FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES. 
Symbol Description 
+ Achieved the corresponding goal 
̶ Not achieved  
€Ƭ Computation Overhead 
€S Communication Cost 
ƫɦ €Ƭ (one-time hash, h(.)) 
ƫχ €Ƭ (one-time hex, hx(.)) 
ƫe €Ƭ (one-time encryption, E(.)) 
ƫē €Ƭ (one-time decryption, D(.)) 
ƫg €Ƭ (key/PWD generation) 
ƫv €Ƭ (verification process) 
ƫƅ €Ƭ (load balancing process) 
ƫme €Ƭ (exponentiation modulo) 
In terms of security, the DRmcc protocol is evaluated based on 
the invulnerability to the known attacks listed in the adversary 
model. The known attacks involved in the comparative 
evaluation are MITM, playback, anonymity and unlinkability, 
offline password guessing, session-key retrieval, 
impersonation, asynchronization, shoulder surfing, and stolen 
smart card attacks. Table 4 shows that the DRmcc protocol is 
more efficient due to its immunity against the known attacks 
compared with other existing works.   
In addition to its mutuality, dynamicity, and utility of OTP, 
Table 4 shows that the DRmcc protocol is more efficient than 
its most related works in terms of scalability. In this study, the 
complexity is measured by calculating the computation 
overhead involved and extra communication cost [37][38][39]. 
The scalability of the existing works is recorded as reported in 
the published papers. The scalability of the DRmcc protocol is 
evaluated by measuring the complexity of operating the DRmcc 
protocol at each MClient and CServer. RDmcc is more scalable due 
to the smaller number of processes involved in its algorithm as 
well as the fewer messages needed for the communication 
between MClient and CServer. For DRmcc, PK’s message take 16 
chars (128 bits) and OTP’s message is 32 chars (256 bits). As 
shown in Table 4, compared with other schemes, the DRmcc 
protocol has the lowest computation overhead and requires the 
least communication cost as well.  
In terms of usability, the DRmcc protocol offers the benefit 
of being memory-wise effortless, easy to learn, and efficient to 
use. As the user is not required to remember and input the 
password in the next authentication to access to the server, the 
protocol is effortless and efficient. Since DRmcc is proposed to 
be run on smartphones and servers without direct interaction 
from the users, it has the benefit of nothing-to-carry and 
physical effortless as the user is not required to carry any gadget 
other than a mobile device. 
 Finally, in terms of deployability, the DRmcc protocol is 
accessible as most disabled users can use a mobile phone 
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without typing in the password. Based on the assumption that 
most users today own a mobile phone, DRmcc offers the benefit 
of negligible cost per user because it is lightweight in 
computation and communication. DRmcc also offers the 
benefit of not using a third party in the protocol and is 
unlinkable because the parameters used in generating the OTP 
are unique and specific to individual mobile devices. The 
mobile users must also provide/have access to their device to 
use the DRmcc; thus, this offers the benefit of requiring explicit 
consent in terms of security. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
 Reciprocal authentication is important to ensure that the 
communication between two parties is genuine. The DRmcc 
protocol attains the reciprocal authentication by using multi-
factor authentication, Diffie–Hellman key exchange, and one-
time password. The SSK exchanged between the sender and 
receiver ensures a reciprocity of authentication between MClient 
and CServer. Multi-factor authentication with one-time password 
is feasible to prevent MITM attacks, especially replay attacks. 
Due to the OTP, which is valid for a single connection only and 
can be immediately used for that connection, DRmcc is 
resistant to asynchronization attacks. A unique feature of the 
DRmcc is its immunity to social engineering attacks, such as 
shoulder surfing, because the OTP is dynamically and 
automatically generated and does not need to be keyed in for 
every new connection. DRmcc is computationally less 
expensive. Thus, considering computational cost and 
robustness, the protocol can be a good choice in authenticating 
and securing data communication in MCC environment. In 
addition to its security and efficiency as an authenticated 
protocol, DRmcc has various merits relevant to dynamicity, 
usability, and deployability. 
In the future, the DRmcc protocol will be enhanced to secure 
the user credentials in case of physical loss of the mobile device. 
In particular, this enhancement will focus on securing the user 
credentials stored in the mobile database to prevent exposure to 
others. This task can be performed by developing a method that 
securely retrieves the current OTP from the mobile device using 
a biometric password of the mobile user. The biometric 
password, which can be used for this purpose, uses fingerprint, 
eye print, or face recognition. Such passwords are difficult to 
crack and therefore, the DRmcc is resistant to stolen device 
attacks. 
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